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Abstract 
Safety research stresses the importance of achieving similar perceptions regarding the 
importance of safety to realize a strong culture while at the same time, acknowledges that 
employees may vary in their safety perceptions. Despite the recognition of this problem, the 
effect that safety issues have upon various hierarchical levels is not differentiated. 
Data for this study were drawn from 116 trucking firms, stratified by three safety 
performance levels. The data were collected from drivers (lowest hierarchical level), 
dispatchers (medium hierarchical level), and safety directors (highest hierarchical level), 
regarding their perceptions of their corporate safety cultures. Perceptions of safety culture 
were analyzed through a linear regression using dummy variables to differentiate the three 
hierarchical groups. The resulting model allowed for examination of the specific antecedents 
of safety culture for each hierarchical employee group and the extent to which the 
hierarchical groups were in agreement with each other. 
Driver fatigue training, driver opportunity for safety input, and top management 
commitment to safety were perceived to be integral determinants of safety culture in all three 
groups. Trucking firms seeking to strengthen their employees' perceptions of safety culture 
might logically begin by improving these three safety issues. The fourth safety practice 
examined, driver autonomy, was not found to be instrumental in shaping safety culture for 
any of the three hierarchical levels. In addition, it should be recognized that various 
employee groups within the firm are influenced by some practices more than others (e.g., 
drivers' perceptions of safety culture are more influenced by top management commitment 
and driver fatigue training). 
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Introduction 
The movement of freight by trucks in the United States has increased tremendously in 
recent years. The number of trucks on U.S. highways increased by 25% between 1995 and 
1999; fortunately, accidents involving trucks have not increased proportionately (13%) 
during the same period (Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2002 #11). Still, any increase in 
the accident rate involving trucks is troubling. The research addressed in this study seeks to 
provide insights into how accidents in the trucking industry might be reduced by better safety 
management practices. 
Safety is not only a matter of engineers, insurance companies, and employees "at 
risk." It is also a matter of corporate culture. Even though accidents are unavoidable and 
interventions to reduce accidents are expensive, some companies seek to reduce the 
probability of accidents by establishing a culture that emphasizes safety. These firms believe 
that accidents and even disasters depend on organizational activities and can thus be 
minimized in frequency and severity (Roberts &Bea, 2001). For example, attitudes and 
behaviors that determine employees' compliance with safety rules may decrease the 
frequency of accidents (Griffin & l~leal, 2000; Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999; Varonen & 
Mattila, 2000; Zohar, 1980). Key safety culture issues that have been identified to prevent 
and minimize accidents are training, empowerment, team communication, and effective 
rewarding systems (Roberts &Bea, 2001). 
The present study uses the concept of organizational culture as a concept entailing the 
assumptions, thoughts, and expectations taken for granted by employees. Culture is defined 
and held collectively (Mearns & Flin, 1999). Accordingly, organizational safety culture 
refers to how organizational members' perceptions interact to form a shared view of safety. 
Research on safety culture states that there is a set of beliefs, norms, and values that 
are held collectively by the members of the organization (Mearns & Flin, 1999). However, 
there are some beliefs within the culture that are not clear but ambiguous and/or 
inconsistently held by different members or groups (Clarke, 1999; Martin, 1992, 2002). 
Safety literature indicates that there is ambiguity in members' perception of safety culture. 
Differences have been observed comparing safety-related perceptions among drivers, 
supervisors, and managers (i.e., comparing employees from different hierarchical levels) 
within the railway industry. On the other hand, it is argued that similar intergroup 
perceptions regarding safety are essential to the development of mutual trust and 
understanding between levels. This basic understanding forms the basis for a positive safety 
culture (Clarke, 1999). 
The potential for differential perceptions related to safety by hierarchical level will be 
explored by comparing perceptions of the extensiveness of four safety-related managerial 
practices: provision of safety training, employee autonomy in matters related to safety, 
employee participation in setting safety policies, and management commitment to safety. 
These practices are commonly used by organizations where safety is highly valued. 
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Purpose 
The purpose of this study is two-fold. First, to report whether factors identified in 
prior research as integral to the perception of a strong safety culture are supported using three 
employee groups in trucking firms: drivers, safety directors, and dispatchers. The factors to 
be examined are (1) driver safety training, (2) driver autonomy regarding safety, (3) 
opportunities for safety input, and (4} top management commitment to safety. The second 
purpose of the research is to evaluate the extent to which there is a consensus among the 
three employee groups regarding the contributions of the above factors in determining 
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erceptions of safety culture. Stated differently, the research asks the question "are drivers', 
safety directors', and dispatchers' perceptions of safety culture shaped by the same factors?" 
This study begins by providing the research background that has explored and 
identified safety measures predictive of safety culture. Given this framework, eight 
hypotheses are stated; these summarize the assumptions regarding individuals' perceptions of 
safety culture in the trucking industry. Next, the design of the research and methodology are 
discussed. This is followed by the presentation of the results considering the mentioned 
hypotheses. The remainder of the study is dedicated to the discussion of the findings and the 
development of conclusions, limitations, and suggestions for future research. 
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Literature Review 
Driver Fatigue Training 
In the trucking industry, a great deal of safety training is directed toward management 
of driver fatigue, as it is a key element predictive of close calls (Crum, Morrow, & Daecher, 
2001) and crashes (Williams &Monaco, 2001). 
Fatigue is impairment in the ability to undertake the driving task and is primarily 
related to lack of sleep, which in turn is influenced by the operational and social constructs 
within which the driver participates (Baas, Charlton, &Bastin, 2000). 
Because it has been observed that behaviors some drivers adopt to cope with fatigue 
are not always ideal (e.g., consumption of alcohol, use of stimulants, poor rest), organizations 
have focused on training drivers on effective ways of managing fatigue (Oron Gilad & 
Shinar, 2000). Results demonstrate that training employees on the prevention of substance 
abuse (alcohol and drugs) has been effective in getting employees to seek help for this 
behavior (Bennett &Lehman, 2001). Organizations typically offer additional kinds of health 
and safety training because of the evidence demonstrating that safety training can help 
prevent injuries. In addition, such training has been found to be positively related with 
productivity (Kaminski, 2001). 
According to the Federal Highway Administration, training is one of the most 
fundamental elements in an effective hours-of-service compliance program (Federal 
Highway Administration, 1997). Individuals who have received safety-related training 
understand organizational safety incentive systems, have greater knowledge- regarding 
appropriate safety behavior, and adhere to proper safety protocol more frequently; hence, 
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safety knowledge significantly predicts actual compliance with safety policies (Griffin & 
Neal, 2000). This occurs because knowledge mediates the impact of safety climate on 
individuals' safety behavior, participation, and compliance with safety. 
Differences among subcultures in the organization may cause training to have a 
different effect on modifying safety attitudes. Employees react differently to training efforts 
depending on how involved their position in the organization demands them or allows them 
to be. When employees take a greater ownership of the training program then it is more 
likely that they will be supportive of it and be more positive about the changes. Contrary, if 
employees are not involved in the development of the program then they may not be 
interested in encouraging the implementation of learning (Griffin &Neal, 2000), which 
makes it more difficult to build a safety culture. 
Despite the difficulties and the different expectations individuals have from training, 
truck drivers are interested in being trained and being involved in training apprentice drivers 
as a way of having their jobs enlarged (McElroy, Rodriguez, Griffin, Morrow, &Wilson, 
1993). Giving drivers the opportunity of training new employees may help them overcome 
negative attitudes toward the company and the job (McElroy et al., 1993). Training is more 
effective if it is perceived as career advancement. 
Driver Autonomy Regarding Safety 
Job autonomy is the objective control that the individual has in a specific domain of 
task process and accomplishment. Job autonomy is different from participation in the sense 
that is an individual decision (not a joint decision as participation) (Evans &Fischer, 1992). 
Part of an employee's autonomy is being able to use alternative work schedules; flextime and 
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compressed workweeks are increasingly being adopted by organizations to satisfy the 
benefits expected by their employees. However, alternative work schedules can have 
unintended negative effects when they interfere with supplier and customer schedules 
(B altes, Briggs, Huff, V~right, &Neuman, 1999) or result in drivers driving at night or in the 
early morning. Thus, alternative work schedules become a hazard given that a higher rate of 
fatigue-related accidents occur during this period (Soccomanno, Shortreed, Yu, 1996). 
The deviation from a natura124 hours rhythm of work that favors daytime work schedules 
over nighttime work schedules causes what is called circadian fatigue (Soccomanno et al., 
1996). On the other hand, alternative work schedules can have positive effects on driver job 
autonomy by allowing drivers to use their own personal and possibly unique circadian 
rhythms . 
Parker, Axtell, and Turner (2001) defined job autonomy as the degree of discretion 
employees have over important decisions in their work, and they found this job characteristic 
to be an outcome of organizational commitment. That is, the positive effects that job 
autonomy has on safety culture assessments occurs primarily through the mechanism of 
organizational commitment (Parker, Axtell, &Turner, 2001). Stated differently, job 
autonomy is mediated by the identification and emotional attachment that the employee has 
for the organization. Therefore, the perception that the employee has about the strength of a 
safety culture is expected to be influenced by the perceived level of autonomy since higher 
levels of autonomy may give rise to higher levels of organizational commitment. 
In addition, the autonomy individuals have seems to diminish the amount of 
perceived work overload (i.e., it provides a way to cope with stress) (Karasek et al., 1981). 
Low status jobs that require low levels of education tend to constrain individual autonomy; 
this, of course, could apply to truck drivers. Thus, autonomy can be viewed as a determinant 
of safety perception via its ability to reduce stress and make drivers feel safer. A failure to 
appreciate this aspect of job autonomy could lead those in higher hierarchical levels to 
underestimate its importance in shaping perceptions of corporate safety culture. 
Hours of service regulations moderate the extent to which organizations can empower 
the driver to manage his or her own hours of work. In spite of the regulations, drivers (and, 
to some extent, organizations) violate hours of driving regulations; this is mediated by years 
of experience, age, and drivers' economic pressure (Williams &Monaco, 2001). Younger 
drivers and those with more years of experience tend to violate hours of service regulations, a 
tendency that declines as drivers get older (Williams &Monaco, 2001). 
In the trucking industry specifically, the driver's pace is determined by shippers' 
demands for tight delivery schedules and how dispatchers assign work schedules (Braver, 
Preusser, &Ulmer, 1999). Therefore, job autonomy in the trucking industry is relative not 
only to safety policies stated by the organization or the law, but also to dispatchers' 
awareness of driver's safety. Dispatchers' decisions to accept or reject loads may contribute 
to hours-of-service violations and driver's fatigue. On the other hand, because driving 
conditions are strictly regulated, drivers' duties are usually clear, as well as the relationship 
with dispatchers and other employees. When job activities and relationships among 
employees, supervisors, and management are clear-cut (i.e., the rights and responsibilities of 
supervisors and employees are already clearly specified), employees can make job related 
decisions without requiring management approval. In other words, truck drivers work 
presents opportunities for genuine autonomy through route selection, schedules, rest breaks, 
etc. 
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A meta-analysis of studies concerning autonomy and participation at work indicated 
that these constructs exhibit similar patterns of interrelation with other outcomes like job 
satisfaction and organizational con:lmitment (Spector, 1986). It appears that these two 
constructs represent the common underlying variable of perceived control. Perceived control 
is especially relevant in that it is an important contributor to health outcomes for employees 
when workloads are heavy (Karasek, Baker, Marxer, Ahlbom, & Theorell, 1981), as may be 
the case of truck driving work. Because the sum of studies shows that employees who 
perceive comparatively high levels of control at work experience fewer physical and 
emotional symptoms, it is expected that these employees have a more positive perception of 
safety culture. 
Even though the concept of job autonomy and participation may overlap constituting 
what is known as employees' perceived control, in this study, these variables have unique 
elements that determine their separate definition and statistical treatment (Evans &Fischer, 
1992). 
Driver Opportunitt'es for Safety Input 
Employees' participation, or the opportunity for safety input, is important because it 
facilitates decision making, which in turn facilitates subsequent task execution. Participation 
includes an interpersonal dynamic (a condition that is absent in job autonomy) (Evans & 
Fischer, 1992). Participation is a "loose-tight" phenomenon described as one in which 
leaders and floor employees influence each other (Sagie, 1997). Stated differently, task 
execution is enhanced when a leader's direction and employee's practice are complementary 
rather than being contradictory. The probability of this occurring is increased when trust 
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among members of the organization is high, which is considered to be the basis of a positive 
safety culture (Clarke, 1999). 
Employee participation is generally regarded as a desirable thing, but the most 
effective combination of management controUemployee participation varies across people 
and jobs. Expectations for participation may vary depending on hierarchical level. Lower- 
level employees react favorably to participation (Beehr &Gupta, 1987), perhaps because it is 
less anticipated. Additionally, the opportunity for input is important in the case of truck 
drivers given their concern for influencing management (McElroy et al., 1993). Truck 
drivers may believe that their daily driving experience could be useful for management in the 
creation and control of safety policies. 
Lavy (1984) found it useful to differentiate between direct and indirect participation. 
The former is associated with feelings of representation in decision-making, with acceptance 
of company policy, with involvement of shop-floor employees, and with the belief that 
participation will assist in company problem solving. The latter type of participation is 
associated with perceptions of delay in decisions and with the belief that supervisors are not 
likely to take more responsibility than is necessary (Lavy, 1984). 
Examples of direct participation relevant to this study would be the creation of safety 
committees at the group level and creating opportunities for employees to participate in 
safety activities. Participation practices have been shown to decrease the severity and 
frequency of occupational injuries; this is true for mandatory and voluntary safety groups 
(O'Toole, 1999). 
Griffin and Neal (2000) included participation in their definition of safety 
performance. Examples of participation are attending to safety meetings and encouraging the 
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safety of others, caring about each other's safety, giving ideas to improve safety conditions, 
and routinely communicating with others about safety. Through these activities, employees 
are engaging in organizational citizenship behaviors and demonstrating safety commitment. 
Hofmann and Fredrick (1999) emphasized the importance of communication in the 
development of a safety environment. The perceptions that individuals have about 
organizational support are positively related to safety communication; in turn, 
communication is positively related with safety commitment and negatively related to 
accidents (Hofmann &Morgeson, 1999). Employees' commitment to safety may be 
demonstrated through their attendance to safety meetings or the extent to which they give 
safety suggestions. Hence, as employees participate, better communication regarding safety 
ensues, and safe working increases (Parker et al., 2001). 
Top Management Commitment to Safety 
There is a great deal of literature that agrees on the importance of management 
concern with safety and employee well being (Griffin &Neal, 2000; Hofmann & Morgeson, 
1999). The perceptions that individuals have about management support for safety is 
considered a higher order safety climate factor because these perceptions reflect how 
employees believe that safety is valued in the organization (Griffin &Neal, 2000). 
Safe behavior can be increased when managerial personnel demonstrate their 
commitment toward employees by enacting strong safety programs. Along the same lines, 
Simard and Marchand (1997) indicated that worker safety compliance is higher when 
supervisors are involved with workers in the conduct of accident prevention activities and 
when employees influence management decisions regarding safety. Management safety 
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practices are recognized as an important predictor of employees' compliance with safety 
measures (Hayes, Perandan, Smecko, &Trask, 1998; Simard &Marchand, 1997). 
Compliance with safety rules, in turn, is related to lower levels of workplace injuries and 
accidents (Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999; Probst &Brubaker, 2001). 
Safety performance is higher when employees have a sense of commitment to the 
firm generated by organizational practices and general trust and respect for their job, for 
safety practices, and for top management involvement in safety programs (Parker et al., 
2001). The perception of support that employees have from their organizations has been 
shown to be critical for the implementation of behavior-based safety programs (DePasquale 
& Geller, 1999) and in the creation and success of safety committees (O'Toole, 1999). 
Management support and appreciation for activities related with safety has been a condition 
for these to be successful (Zohar, 1980). Research in the trucking industry has observed that 
drivers' perception about management determines their .perception of safety conditions. 
Drivers claimed to be less safe when they believed their employers had less regard for their 
safety and were less concerned about the number of hours they drive (Walton, 1999). 
Previous research has also found management commitment to safety to be positively 
related to work group cohesiveness (Simard &Marchand, 1997). High work group 
cohesiveness, in turn, enhances the likelihood that all employees will perceive work-related 
practices similarly, including the extent to which the organization has a strong or weak safety 
culture. Hence, top management commitment to safety not only may affect perceptions 
regarding the strength of a safety culture, but through its effects on group cohesion it may 
also explain how employees from diverse places in the organization come to view safety 
culture similarly. 
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Perception of Safety Culture 
When talking about perceptions, it must be noted that individuals tend to disassociate 
themselves from negative outcomes and associate themselves with positive outcomes; this is 
an "ego defensive" behavior called self-serving bias (Bierhoff, 1989). For example, 
dispatchers may not think that they are assigning tight schedules (Braver et al., 1999), drivers 
may underestimate their violation of work hour rules (Braver, Preusser, Preusser, Baum, 
Beilock., &Ulmer, 1992}, or drivers may believe that other road users drive faster than they 
do (Walton, 1999). The self-serving bias could be especially true in the case of an injury, 
accident, or close call because these may be interpreted as situations that occurred due to an 
external cause. There are studies that emphasize how reluctant people are to admit blame for 
vehicle crashes (Geller, 2001). 
Taking into account that perceptions could be biased, the present study does not 
question how drivers, dispatchers, and top management perceive safety behaviors, or 
specifically driver's safety behaviors. The present study is concerned with the activities, 
safety practices, and value that the organization places on safety; it is concerned about 
hierarchical, not individual, perceptions of safety. 
A factor that might influence the perception of organizational safety culture is the 
type of job held by the employee and how potentially dangerous or injurious that job may be. 
The safety-risk perception that an employee has of his or her job depends on the objectives of 
the job, its characteristics, and the employee's personality. Changes in the work environment 
(e.g., a job change or promotion) have been shown to alter the perceived effects of work on 
health, independent of employee's personality (Ettner & Grzywacz, 2001). 
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Individuals' thoughts about safety and their safety behaviors constitute a part of the 
organizational culture. However, culture is not necessarily shared and unique (Marin, 2002), 
thus not all individuals ought to have the same perception of safety. Perceptions that 
individuals have of their organizational culture can be analyzed using three different 
perspectives: integration, differentiation, and fragmentation. Which one is used depends 
upon how members are thought to view their roles and relationships (Martin, 1992, 2002). 
The integration perspective assumes that members' perceptions are consistent and that 
there is an organizational consensus. The differentiation perspective focuses on the conflict 
and lack of consensus among members. Finally, the fragmentation perspective argues that 
the organization is in a constant state of change, and that therefore, its culture is always in the 
process of being reconstructed. This third perspective focuses on the ambiguity and 
complexity that makes it difficult to find a cultural consensus within the organization 
(Martin, 1992). Perspectives organizational members have about the culture of their company 
may be related to their hierarchical position. Head office employees tend to have a more 
integrated perspective of culture. Middle level employees are inclined towards the 
differentiation perspective and Iower level employees view culture in fragmented terms 
(Harris & Ogbonna, 1998). 
Differences attached to the importance of various safety areas are a function of 
organizational position (Clarke, 1999). In other words, different safety priorities were 
evident and contingent on hierarchical level (Clarke, 1999). The different perspectives about 
culture could be reflected in the employees' perceptions regarding health and safety. But if 
the employees do not share a common safety culture, efforts to enhance safety attitudes and 
behaviors in the company may be attenuated (Harvey et al., 2001). 
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Hierarchal label influence the perception of safety culture and the perception of safety 
climate as well (that is, the perception of specific issues that are immediately interpretable, 
while culture is held collectively and requires a history}. Perceptions of climate are 
hierarchically structured because individuals evaluate their environment in terms of their 
personal values, the significance of the events, and how specific things in their workplace 
affect their well-being (Griffin &Neal, 2000). Due to these features, drivers' perceptions 
about a safe environment may be different from managers' and supervisors' perceptions. 
Despite the support that is observed in the literature for why perceptions regarding 
safety may be disparate among organizational members, prior research examining the safety 
factors that are incorporated in this research did not detect any difference in the importance 
attached to them by different organizational levels 
Clarke (1999) argues that similar intergroup perceptions regarding safety are essential 
to the development of mutual trust and understanding between levels, which forms the basis 
for a positive safety culture. Zohar (1980) agrees with the.idea of having a unified cognition 
about safety aspects; however, he limits this homogeneous concept to production workers. 
Organizations that value safety may work to establish positive safety cultures by setting up 
policies and engaging in practices that promote a common safety vision. The present study 
would argue that this common safety vision ought to be developed throughout the 
organization (particularly those in the trucking industry) within its different hierarchical 
levels. 
On one hand safety literature points out at the disagreement that organizational 
members have regarding safety perceptions. On the other hand, this literature agrees on the 
importance that issues such as training, job autonomy, employee participation, and 
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management con:lmitment has for the expected safety of a company without making any 
distinction among individuals. 
Even though individuals exhibit some individual differences in their perceptions, 
there are some issues for which their perceptions may be similar, regardless of their 
knowledge, status, job, or experience. For example, a room with a temperature of 32 °C (90 
°F) would be perceived as hot for most healthy individuals, others would think is warm 
enough to feel comfortable. But, given the whole population that experiences the event, 
there may be an agreement in saying that the room is very warm. For certain issues, it is 
possible to find an agreement that describes the corporate culture regardless of individual 
preferences. 
Assuming that training, driver autonomy, driver opportunity for safety input, and top 
management commitment are essential safety issues, the present study expects to find a 
similar perception about safety across employees on different hierarchical levels of the 
trucking industry. If this were the case, these may be factors that should be universally taken 
into account by organizations in hope of developing a consistent safety culture. This would 
be significant especially within the trucking industry. 
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Hypotheses 
For each of the safety measures accounted for, two sets of hypotheses were proposed. 
The first sets of hypotheses (odd numbered) were formulated as simple relationships between 
the dependent and independent variable. Next, the second sets of hypotheses (even 
numbered) were based on a multiple regression that tested if safety measures were true 
predictors of safety culture. 
Driver Fatigue Training 
Hypothesis 1 
The extent to which drivers are perceived to be trained about driver fatigue 
issues is positively related to perceptions of a strong safety culture. 
Hypothesis 1 a: The more drivers believe they have been trained about driver fatigue, 
the more highly company safety culture is rated. 
Hypothesis lb: The more dispatchers believe drivers have been trained about driver 
fatigue, the more highly company safety culture is rated. 
Hypothesis 1 c : The more safety directors believe drivers have been trained about 
driver fatigue, the more highly company safety culture is rated. 
Hypothesis 2 
The extent to which drivers are trained about driver fatigue issues will be a 
significant predictor of safety culture 
Hypothesis 2a:The extent to which drivers are trained about driver fatigue issues will 
be a significant predictor of safety culture for drivers. 
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Hypothesis 2b: The extent to which drivers are trained about driver fatigue issues will 
be a significant predictor of safety culture for dispatchers. 
Hypothesis 2c: The extent to which drivers are trained about driver fatigue issues will 
be a significant predictor of safety culture for safety directors. 
Previous research indicates that safety knowledge, which may be gained through 
training, is positively related with employee's perception of job security (Probst &Brubaker, 
2001). Additionally, it has been noted that job training programs are a manifestation of a 
management's commitment to safety (Zohar, 1980), which implies that the perception of 
safety requires the involvement of several (if not all) members and hierarchical levels of the 
organization. It is asserted that driver fatigue training should play an importance role in 
formulating employees' perceptions of a strong safety culture 
Driver Autonomy Regarding Safety 
Hypothesis 3 
The extent to which drivers are perceived to be afforded autonomy with respect 
to driver fatigue issues is positively related to perceptions of a strong safety culture. 
Hypothesis 3a: The more drivers believe they are afforded autonomy with respect to driver 
fatigue, the more highly company safety culture is rated. 
Hypothesis 3b: The more dispatchers believe drivers are afforded autonomy with respect to 
driver fatigue, the more highly company safety culture is rated. 
Hypothesis 3c: The more safety directors believe drivers are afforded autonomy with 
respect to driver fatigue, the more highly company safety culture is rated. 
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Hypothesis 4 
The extent to which drivers are afforded autonomy with respect to driver fatigue 
issues will be a significant predictor of safety culture. 
Hypothesis 4a: The extent to which drivers are afforded autonomy with respect to 
driver fatigue issues will be a significant predictor of safety culture for drivers. 
Hypothesis 4b: The extent to which drivers are afforded autonomy with respect to 
driver fatigue issues will be a significant predictor of safety culture dispatchers. 
Hypothesis 4c: The extent to which drivers are afforded autonomy with respect to 
driver fatigue issues will be a significant predictor of safety culture safety directors. 
Safety research has included job autonomy as a work practice that promotes 
organizational safety. Job autonomy goes beyond safety rules and hours-of-service limits; it 
also establishes a control from within through the exercise of driver judgment. Thus, job 
autonomy is positively related with safe working (Parker et al., 2001). 
In the trucking industry perceptions of autonomy might be reflected in truck drivers' 
authority to judge their level of fatigue. Such autonomy may enhance organizational 
commitment, which in turn encourages drivers to seek to avoid driving when fatigued and 
thereby reduce accident potential. To the extent that drivers feel and act in this manner, they 
are likely to describe their organizations as having a strong corporate safety culture. 
The role of supervisors (in this case, safety directors and dispatchers) is important in 
enhancing employee safety perception. Organizations that allow supervisors to grant drivers 
the authority to self-manage fatigue are likely to be perceived as endorsing a strong safety 
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culture because supportive supervision is positively related with safe working (Parker et al., 
2001). 
Driver Opportunities for Safety Input 
Hypothesis 5 
The extent to which drivers are perceived to be able to provide safety-related 
input is positively related to perceptions of a strong safety culture. 
Hypothesis Sa: The more drivers believe they can provide safety-related input, the 
more highly company safety culture is rated. 
Hypothesis Sb: The more dispatchers believe drivers can provide safety-related input, 
the more highly company safety culture is rated. 
Hypothesis Sc: The more safety directors believe drivers can provide safety-related 
input, the more highly company safety culture is rated. 
I~ypothesis 6 
The extent to which drivers can provide safety-related input will be a significant 
predictor of safety culture. 
Hypothesis 6a: The extent to which drivers can provide safety-related input will be a 
significant predictor of safety culture for drivers. 
Hypothesis 6b: The extent to which drivers can provide safety-related input will be a 
significant predictor of safety culture for dispatchers. 
Hypothesis 6c: The extent to which drivers can provide safety-related input will be a 
significant predictor of safety culture for safety directors. 
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Because the concern in the trucking industry is with respect to fatigue as a prime 
determinant of safety, the participant role assumed by drivers is very important. Participation 
can have a positive impact on decision quality when the individuals involved have relevant 
information to offer and when they are willing to contribute to organizational decisions 
(Jenkins &Lawler, 1981). In turn, this participation generates more favorable work-related 
attitudes and perceptions among employees (Beehr ~ Gupta, 1987). In the case of safety, 
drivers have relevant information since their experience in dealing with fatigue is important 
for the company development of safety culture. It would seem reasonable to assert that the 
greater the direct participation of drivers in safety-related matters, the stronger the control 
over fatigue. Such participation also would enhance favorable perceptions related to the 
organization's safety culture. 
Top Management Commitment to Safety 
Hypothesis 7 
The extent to which top management is perceived to be committed to driving 
safety is positively related to a strong safety culture. 
Hypothesis 7a: The more drivers believe top management is committed to driving 
safety, the more highly company safety culture is rated. 
Hypothesis 7b: The more dispatchers believe top management is committed to 
driving safety, the more highly company safety culture is rated. 
Hypothesis 7c: The more safety directors believe top management is committed to 
driving safety, the more highly company safety culture is rated. 
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Hypothesis 8 
The extent to which top management is perceived to be committed to driving 
safety will be a significant predictor of safety culture. 
Hypothesis 8a: The extent to which top management is perceived to be committed to 
driving safety will be a significant predictor of safety culture for drivers. 
Hypothesis 8b: The extent to which top management is perceived to be committed to 
driving safety will be a significant predictor of safety culture dispatchers. 
Hypothesis 8c: The extent to which top- management is perceived to be committed to 
driving safety will be a significant predictor of safety culture safety directors. 
The perception of support that employees have from their organization and the 
relationship with its leaders is critical to the success of safety programs (DePasquale & 
Geller, 1999; Haines, Merrheim, &Roy, 2001). When employees feel they are valuable for 
the organization, because they feel that their contributions are important, they tend to comply 
and believe in organizational efforts to improve their well-being. 
Supervisory and leader communication with other members is positively related to 
safety commitment, and this communication with leaders is negatively related to 
occupational accidents (Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999). Therefore, leaders' involvement in 
the organization's safety programs might determine a more positive perception of safety 
culture. This occurs because when employees perceive management to be committed to 
safety they tend to follow this behavior, comply, and apply safety measures. As compliance 





Data for this study are drawn from a larger study of motor carrier scheduling practices 
in U.S. trucking concerns (Crum et al., 2001). The data reported here reflect information 
collected from drivers, dispatchers, and safety directors regarding their perceptions of their 
corporate safety culture and other thoughts about safety practices in general. 
Firms that were available in the federal government's Office of Motor Carriers 
Census file and had been rated for safety in the Motor Carrier Safety Status Measurement 
System, known as SafeStat, constituted the primary population. The sampling procedure 
used to acquire these data is described below. SafeStat holds data for 136,745 firms. In 1999 
there were 77,216 firms exclusively engaged in trucking that carried only freight; these were 
the firms eligible for selection. Those that transported both freight and passengers were 
excluded. The population then was restricted further to firms with at least four drivers, 
leaving 21,292 carriers. Next, these companies were grouped into three safety performance 
rating categories (poor, average, and top safety performers). Sample carriers were selected 
randomly from within each category. Of the companies that were contacted (566), 66.1 % 
agreed to participate (374). The percentages of firms that were willing to participate and 
returned the surveys approximated a normal distribution, with 32 top firms, 53 average firms, 
and 31 poor performing firms providing usable data. This sample of 116 firms constituted 
the unit of analysis of the present study. 
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The overall response rate was 31 % (116 of 374 firms). Not quite half (44.8%) were 
"for-hire" companies, 21.6% described themselves as private carriers (companies hauling 
their own products), and 4.3 % described themselves as both. 
Data were collected through the safety director from each firm. This representative 
was contacted via telephone and solicited for his or her firm's voluntary participation in the 
study. Carriers that chose not to participate were replaced with firms selected at random 
from the appropriate safety performance group. Sampling continued until the data collection 
time deadline was reached; by this time, 116 firms had returned surveys with usable data. 
At each company, the safety director was asked to distribute the surveys, one for 
him/herself, two for dispatchers, and three for drivers. The safety director was instructed to 
select "typical" dispatchers and drivers; that is, neither the best nor the worst. At least one 
driver did provide usable data, and when more than one driver and/or dispatcher supplied 
usable data a single driver and/or dispatcher was selected randomly to be representative of 
.the firm. Respondents were instructed to put their completed survey into the provided 
envelope, seal it, and return it to the safety director, who would return the entire packet to the 
researchers. 
Most driver respondents were male (95.6%), with an average age of 43 years (ranging 
from 22 to 63 years), and with an average of 14.92 years of driving experience. Most drivers 
(87.6%) classified themselves as company drivers, while just over ten percent (10.6%) were 
owner-operators or independent contractors. Only 1.8% were temporary, casual, or leased 
drivers. On average, drivers reported they had worked for 15 companies during the last two 
years, with a minimum of 1 (1 %) and a maximum of 41 (1 %). Relatively few drivers (5.3%) 
were unionized. Regarding driving behavior, the estimated number of miles per week was 
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1,890, with a range of 20 to 3,500. With respect to accidents, 80.4% of the drivers reported 
that they had not had a reportable crash in the previous two years and 96.6% reported that 
they had not had a chargeable crash (i.e., received a citation) during the same period. 
Although most dispatchers were men (67.2%), a good percentage of women (20.7%) 
held this position. (Gender was not reported for the other 12.1 %.) Dispatchers' average age 
was 41 years (ranging from 21 to 65 years). Some dispatchers previously had worked as 
drivers, as reflected in an average of 7.39 years of driving experience, which ranged from 
zero years (39.8%) up to 30 years (2.0%). The mean number of years of experience as 
dispatcher were 8.56, ranging from 1 (10.9%) through 26 years (1.0%). Regarding the nature 
of their job, 53.9% of the dispatchers performed this job for the same drivers, 32.4% 
dispatched not only for the same group of drivers but also for others, and 7.8% of them 
dispatched for a customer or region. Dispatchers reported having worked for a minimum of 
one (80.9%), and a maximum of eight (l . l %) commercial motor vehicle companies for the 
last two years, with an average of 1.34. 
Because there was not much interest in safety directors' demographic characteristics 
this information was not collected; however, there were some alternative data provided. 
There were some companies in which the safety director was also the CEO or owner of the 
company, which was reported in 4.5% of the cases. For most companies 76.4% of them 
the safety director indeed received this title and for 13.6% of the companies his or her title 
was fleet manager. Given their job status, 22.7% of the safety directors held this position as 
a full-time job, while 77.3°Io not only were responsible for safety but also had other duties. 
Finally, with respect to safety directors' activities, 72.5 % of them reported being responsible 
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for driving and non-driving operations and 27.5 % reported being responsible for driving 
operations only. 
Measures 
Predictors of Safety: Independent Variables 
Organizational members were given statements regarding issues that were mentioned 
by the literature as predictors of safety. They were asked to report the extent to which they 
believe these statements were true using a 1 to 7 scale. "To a very little extent" (1), "To some 
extent" (4), and "To a very large extent" (7) was the wording of the response option 
framework. All independent variables were measured with the use of this scale. 
Driver safety training was measured by the extent that respondents thought drivers 
have been trained about driver fatigue issues. Driver autonomy was measured by the extent 
that respondents thought drivers were the best judges of whether or not they were too tired to 
drive. Driver participation was measured by the extent to which respondents thought that 
drivers in their company had opportunities to make suggestions and voice complaints 
regarding safety and fatigue. Finally, top management commitment was measured by the 
extent to which respondents thought that top management in their company was committed 
to driving safety (Appendix A). These single-item measures constitute the four independent 
variables within each organizational level, identified by the three types of respondents 
(driver, dispatcher, and safety director). 
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Perception of Safety: Dependent Variable 
Perception of company safety culture was a vaziable common to each of the 
organizational levels that was taken into account in the study. 
Driver, dispatcher, and safety director perception of safety culture was measured using a 
four-item scale consisting of opinions about the concern organizations have regarding safety 
and fatigue. Respondents reported their level of agreement using a (1) strongly disagree to a 
(7) strongly agree response-option questionnaire. The item responses were summed to yield 
a theoretical range of 4 to 28 (see Appendix A); observed values had the same range. 
Cronbach alpha values were calculated for each organizational level. The Cronbach alpha 
for drivers was .91, for dispatchers was .88, and for safety directors was .88. These values 
indicate that culture was measured reliably in all these groups. 
Data Analysis 
Correlations that described the relationship between the dependent variable and each 
of the independent variables were calculated and interpreted (Table 1). Next, a multiple 
linear regression model was used to analyze the effect that safety measures had on 
individuals' perception of safety culture (Table 2). Several F-tests were performed in order 
to evaluate more precisely differences among hierarchical levels and the contribution of each 
variable to the overall model (Table 3). 
Collinearity problems among the variables were examined due to the close 
relationship that has been observed through the literature between three of the independent 
variables (autonomy, participation, and top management commitment). Collinearity occurs 
when, in a multiple regression, the explanatory variables are correlated (Golberger, 1991). 
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Because of this condition, problems that could arise are inflated standard errors and an 
outcome whereby variables that really are significant appear to be insignificant. However, if 
the effect of a coefficient still were significant, in spite of its inflated standard error, this 
would occur because its true value is so large. 
Model 
The dependent variable examined here, perception of safety culture, was 
differentiated across the three organizational groups with the use of three dummy variables. 
The three dummy variables allowed modeling in one regression (Bowerman &O'Connell, 
1990) the effect of the independent variables on the perception of safety culture of the three 
different groups (drivers, dispatchers, and safety directors). If the dummy variables were not 
used, three independent regressions would have been needed; comparisons between groups 
would not have been as simple as in the model that was chosen. 
The resulting model allowed identification of the safety issues (independent 
variables) that predicted safety culture for each level of the organization. For 
i = 1, 2, 3,..., 315 , (33 observations were excluded due to missing data) the following model 
was estimated, 
SP = ~o ~" ~i d 2~ + ~Zd 3~ -~" 
,a3d,iT +~3,~d2iT +~35d~lT + 
~6di~A~ + ~~d2►AI + /~sd3~A~ + 
~9d~,P + ~iod 2~ P + ~ i ,d~~P + 
~i2d1~M~ + ~i3d~~M~ + 1~14d3~M► + E~ 
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where SP represents the safety perception of the i-th individual, dl j takes the value 
of one if the individual is a driver and zero otherwise, d2i takes the value of one if the 
individual is a dispatcher and zero otherwise, d3i takes the value of one if the individual is a 
safety director and zero otherwise, T is the perception of individual i regarding driver's 
fatigue training, At is the perception of individual i about divers' autonomy, P is the 
perception of individual i about drivers' opportunity for safety input, Ml is the perception of 
individual i about top management commitment to safety, and ~~ is the random error term. 
The individuals belong to three different categories: driver, dispatcher, and safety director. 
Note that when the safety perception of a driver is estimated, then d,l =1, d21 = 0 , 
and d31 = 0 , so that the regression equation becomes 
SP = ~30 + ~3d,lT + ~6di~A► + ~9d liP + ~i2d ~~M~ + ~~ 
Likewise, when the safety perception of a dispatcher is estimated, then d,l = 0 , 
d2; =1, and dal = 0 ; so that the regression equation becomes 
SP = ~id2~ + ~C34d2jT + ~~d2~A~ ~" ~iod 2~ ~' + ~i3d2tM~ + ~r 
Similarly, when the safety perception of a safety director is estimated, then d,l = 0 , 
d2i = 0, and d3; =1; so that the regression equation becomes 
SP = ~Zd3~ + ~sd317; + l~sd3►A~ + /~l I d 3iP + ~3,~d3iM~ + ~~ 
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Results 
The model designed to explain the perception of safety culture in the trucking 
industry was found to be plausible. An F-test for the null hypothesis that all the coefficients 
jointly equal zero was not rejected, giving evidence of the goodness of fit of the model 
(F(223,77) = 1.50, p < 0.02). This also was supported by a high R-squared value of 0.66 (the 
adjusted R-squared value was 0.64; see Table 2). Note that the R-squared value in this case 
should not be interpreted as it is done in the classical way because the model as it is 
estimated implies the estimation of three different linear models, one for each group. 
Therefore, the model is useful to predict the safety perceptions for a particular group and not 
to predict safety perceptions in general. The model is also useful to make comparisons 
among the groups. 
Before explaining the results for each of the independent variables, notice that in the 
model that was formulated in this study the intercept and the differences between the 
intercept and each of the dummies (Table 2) provided interesting results. 
The intercept for the driver shows that when no independent variable was introduced, 
that is when no safety issues were taken into consideration, the impact of the dependent 
variable was not significantly different form zero. In other words, without any intervention 
in safety measures (through training, driver autonomy, driver opportunity for safety input, or 
top management commitment), drivers' perception of safety was not a statistically significant 
predictor of perception of safety culture. 
However, this was not the case for dispatchers and safety directors. When no safety 
measures were accounted for, dispatchers and safety directors perceived that there was some 
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nonzero level of safety. The difference in the intercept of drivers and dispatchers was 
statistically significant (t = 1.96, p = 0.05); and so was the difference in the intercept of 
drivers and safety directors (t = 3.55, p < 0.001). 
The difference in the intercept of drivers and dispatchers could also be understood 
just as dispatchers' intercept; and the difference in the intercept of drivers and safety 
directors could be understood just as safety directors' intercept. This direct interpretation of 
dispatchers' and safety directors' intercept is possible because drivers' intercept was not 
statistically significant. 
However, an omnibus F-test showed no significant difference among the coefficients 
of the three intercepts (Table 3, A.2.); the null hypothesis of no difference among the 
intercepts for the drivers, dispatchers, and safety directors was not rejected. In other words, 
the differences among the drivers', dispatchers', and safety directors' intercepts were not 
large enough to be statistically significant. Additionally, because jointly these intercepts 
were statistically different from zero (F(3, 300) = 18.24 p < 0.001) (Table 3, A.1.), it is 
possible to say that when no safety measures are accounted for, individuals in the 
organization may still perceive that there is a safety culture. 
Driver Fatigue Training 
The relationship between drivers' fatigue training and the perception of a strong 
safety culture was evaluated. The perception that the three organizational members have 
about driver fatigue training was tested as a predictor of safety culture. 
Given the significance of the Pearson correlations (Table 1), the following 
conclusions were drawn. Support was found for hypotheses 1 a, 1 b, and 1 c. The three 
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relationships were positive and significant at the .OS level. These hypotheses stated that the 
more that drivers, dispatchers, and safety directors believe that drivers have been trained 
about driver fatigue, the more highly each group would rate the company's safety culture. 
< 0.01 . The The strongest of the three correlations was the one for drivers (r = 0.52, p ) 
correlations for dispatchers (r = 0.39, p < 0.01) and safety directors (r = 0.36, p < 0.01) also 
were signs scant. 
Next, this basic information was further explored though a multiple regression 
equation (Table 2). The estimated mean change in safety culture perception that drivers, 
dispatchers, and safety directors had when drivers' level of training increases by one unit was 
statistically significant (t = 6.25, p < 0.001; t = 2.88, and p = 0.004, and t = 2.13, p = 0.034, 
respectively). This means that when driver fatigue training was introduced in to the model, 
drivers, dispatchers, and safety directors perceived a stronger safety culture to be present. 
This result was stronger for drivers; a change in one unit of training would mean a change as 
low as 0.17 or as high as 0.33 in their safety perception. For dispatchers, a change in one 
unit of training would change their perception of safety somewhat, between 0.05 and 0.25. 
Driver training will change safety directors' perception of a safety culture between .001 and 
0.23. (These statements are based on the 95% confidence interval for B.) 
The value of partial Eta squared confirmed the importance that "driver fatigue 
training" had for the model. The effect size of drivers' opinion regarding their own training 
was one of the largest contributors to the model, with Eta squared = 0.12. Dispatchers' and 
safety directors' opinion about driver's fatigue training had a smaller contribution to the 
model, with partial Eta squared values of 0.03 and 0.02 (respectively). 
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An F-test that tested the null hypothesis of no difference among drivers, dispatchers, 
and safety directors failed to be rejected (Table 3, B.2.). Pairwise comparisons confirmed 
that there was no significant difference between driver and dispatcher opinion on drivers' 
training or between dispatcher and safety director opinion of drivers' training as a predictor 
of safety culture (Table 3, B . 3 . and B . S . ). However, the comparison between drivers and 
safety directors showed that the effect that driver fatigue training had on these two groups 
was statistically different (F(1,300) = 3.98 p < 0.05) (Table 3, B.4.). 
In other words, even though drivers and safety directors did not have the same 
opinion about driver fatigue training, this issue seems to predict perception of safety culture 
for both individuals. Moreover, the bulk of the evidence supports that all three constituent 
groups (i.e., drivers, dispatchers, and safety directors) are equally influenced by driver 
fatigue training. 
An F-test for the null hypothesis that all coefficients accounted for drivers' fatigue 
training are simultaneously equal to zero was not rejected (F(3,300)=17.31, p < 0.001) (Table 
3, B.l.). Thus, hypothesis 2, which stated individuals' perception about driver fatigue 
training could be a predictor of safety culture, was supported. This means that, even though 
driver fatigue training might not have the same level of importance for all individuals, driver 
fatigue training is an important factor for the overall perception of safety culture. 
Driver Autonomy Regarding Safety 
Hypothesis 3, the extent to which drivers are perceived to be afforded autonomy with 
respect to fatigue issues and its relationship to a strong safety culture, was evaluated. The 
corresponding hypotheses 3a and 3c were not supported; that is, for drivers and safety 
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directors the extent to which drivers are afforded autonomy did not influence their perception 
of safety culture. On the other hand, drivers' autonomy seemed to be positively correlated 
with dispatchers' perception of safety culture. Hypothesis 3b—the more dispatchers believe 
drivers are afforded autonomy with respect to driver fatigue, the more highly company safety 
culture is rated was supported (r = 0.21, p < 0.05; Table 1). 
Hypothesis 4, the extent to which drivers are afforded autonomy with respect to 
driver fatigue issues is a significant predictor of safety culture, was tested through a multiple 
regression equation (Table 2). The estimated mean change in safety perception that drivers, 
dispatchers, and safety directors had when there was a change of one unit in driver autonomy 
was not statistically significant. Drivers' perceived level of autonomy did not have an effect 
on any of their perception of safety culture. This was confirmed through an F test that 
accounted for all coefficients related to driver autonomy, hypothesis 4, which sated that 
"driver autonomy" did not have any significant contribution to the model, was not supported 
(Table 3, C.l.). 
The statistical significance of drivers' , dispatchers' , and safety directors' level of 
agreement regarding the difficulty of considering driver autonomy as a predictor of safety 
culture also was confirmed through an F-test for the relevant null hypothesis. This test 
showed no significant difference among the three coefficients (Table 3, C.2.). Thus the 
evidence supports the conclusion that all three constituent groups (i.e., drivers, dispatchers, 
and safety directors) agree that driver autonomy does not play an integral role in shaping 
safety culture. 
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Driver Opportunities for Safety Input 
Hypothesis 5, the extent to which drivers are perceived to be able to provide safety-
related input and how this is related to perceptions of a strong safety culture, was evaluated. 
The opportunities that individuals perceived drivers had for safety input had a 
positive and strong correlation with their perception of safety culture. The correlation for 
drivers was r = 0.45, r = 0.62 for dispatchers, and r = 0.69 for safety directors. Thus, 
hypotheses Sa, Sb, and Sc were supported with a 99% level of confidence. 
It was not possible to reject null hypothesis 6a, which stated that there was no change 
in drivers' safety perception given a change of one unit in the opportunity they have to 
participate by providing safety input. However, null hypotheses 6b and 6c were rejected 
(Table 2). The mean change in dispatchers' perception of safety was statistically significant 
given the change of one unit in driver participation (t = 2.06, p < 0.04). Given the confidence 
interval of the unstandardized coefficient, a change in one unit in driver participation may 
have a small change of 0.01 on dispatchers' perception of safety culture, or it could change it 
as much as 0.31 (with a 95% level of confidence). 
The relationship between driver participation and perception of safety culture was 
also important, and even stronger, for safety directors (t = 2.95, p < 0.003). Notice that the 
95°Io confidence interval for this group ranged from 0.08 to 0.38, which confirms the concern 
that safety directors had for drivers' participation as a predictor of a safety culture. 
Even though driver participation seems to be a stronger predictor of safety culture for 
safety directors than for dispatchers, an F-test showed no significant difference among these 
coefficients (Table 3, D.S.). Furthermore, an F-test for the difference between drivers', 
dispatchers' , and safety directors' perceptions of driver opportunity for safety input was not 
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significantly significant (Table 3, D.2.). Stated differently, there was no statistical difference 
among hierarchical levels on the effect that opportunity for safety input had in their 
perception of safety culture. 
Next, the null hypothesis of driver's dispatcher's and safety director's opinion about 
driver opportunity for safety input being equal to zero was rejected (F (3, 300) = 4.94, p < 
0.002). This indicated that agreement among the three hierarchical levels was in favor of 
drivers' opportunity for safety input as a predictor of safety culture (i.e., drivers, dispatchers, 
and safety directors attributed similar levels of importance to driver safety input as an 
antecedent of safety culture). In other words, taking into account the three coefficients 
jointly, driver opportunity for safety input was found to be an important predictor of safety 
culture; hypothesis 6 was thus supported (Table 3, D.1). 
Top Management Commitment to Safety 
The relationship between individuals' perceptions of top management commitment to 
safety and their perception of safety culture was found to be positively and statistically 
significant for the three categories of respondents. 
Hypothesis 7 and its following subset of hypotheses (7a, 7b, and 7c) were strongly 
supported. The correlation was r = 0.78 (p < 0.01) in the case of drivers' perception; r = 0.72 
(p < 0.01) for dispatchers; and r = 0.70 (p < 0.01) for safety directors. 
Hypothesis 8 and its subsidiary three hypotheses stating that top management 
commitment was a significant predictor of the perception a safety culture for the three groups 
of employees also were confirmed. The effect that a change in top management commitment 
to safety had on safety perception of drivers, dispatchers, and safety directors was 
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statistically significant (t = 11.91, t = 5.25, and t = 3.47, respectively; p < 0.001 in each case). 
Stated differently, top management commitment was found to be a predictor of drivers' 
perception of safety culture (hypothesis 8a), dispatchers' perception of safety culture 
(hypothesis 8b), and safety directors' perception of safety culture (hypothesis 8c). 
An omnibus F-test showed that there was a significant difference (F (2, 300) = 9.03, p 
< 0.001) between drivers, dispatchers, and safety directors in how their perception of safety 
changed given a change of one unit in the commitment top management had to safety (Table 
3, E.2.). Pairwise comparisons complemented this finding, and allowed determining which 
pairs of respondents were different from each other. 
Given individuals' perceptions of top management commitment as a predictor of 
safety culture, the difference between drivers' and dispatchers' coefficients was statistically 
significant (F (l , 300) = 7.46, p = 0.007); and so was the difference between drivers' and 
safety directors' coefficients (F (l , 300) = 15.86, p < 0.001) (Table 3, E.3. and E.4.). The 
difference between dispatchers' and safety directors' coefficients was not statistically 
significant. 
Despite differences in the effect that top management commitment had on different 
groups' perceptions of safety culture, this variable did have a significant contribution to the 
model. Drivers' perception of top management commitment to safety had the largest 
contribution to the model; the estimated effect size was 0.32. The effect sizes of top 
management commitment to safety for dispatchers and safety directors indicated that these 
effects also were relevant (0.8 and 0.4 respectively). 
Additionally, an F-test for the null hypothesis that all coefficients related to top 
management commitment were simultaneously equal to zero, was not rejected (F (3, 300) _ 
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60.50, p < 0.001), providing support for hypothesis 8 (Table 3, E. l .). Top management 
commitment to safety is a predictor of safety culture for the overall model (regardless of the 
different effect it has over perceptions of safety culture among various hierarchical levels). 
However, drivers and dispatchers, along with drivers and safety directors, did exhibit 
differences in the importance they accorded top management commitment to safety in 
determining safety culture, with drivers valuing this factor more strongly. 
Company Performance Safety Rating 
Companies were grouped into three safety performance rating categories (poor, 
average, and top safety performers). The sample of 116 companies had a normal distribution 
among these categories (31 poor, 53 average, and 32 top performing companies). 
Companies' safety performance rating was correlated with individual perception of 
safety culture to determine the accuracy of their perception. The relationship between 
dispatchers' perception of safety culture and companies' safety performance rating was not 
significantly different from zero. The same finding was reported for safety directors' 
perception of safety culture. Both dispatchers and safety directors had a relatively high 
average perception of how safe is their corporate culture (means = 5.90 and 5.51, 
respectively); in fact, there was a positive and significant relationship between their 
perceptions of safety (r = 0.32, p < 0.01) (Table 4). 
The relationship between drivers' perception of safety culture and companies' safety 
performance rating was negative and significantly different from zero 
(r = 0.22, p < 0.05); in other words, the poorest the rating of companies' safety performance 
the higher drivers' perception of safety culture (Table 4). The relationship between drivers' 
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and dispatchers' perception of safety culture was significantly different from zero and 
positive (r = 0.28, p < 0.01). Note that drivers also had a relatively high average perception 
of safety culture about their company (mean = 5.21). 
Test for collinearity 
In the regression model it was observed that there were high levels of collinearity 
among the independent variables. Some of the variance inflation factor (VIF) coefficients 
were fairly large (> 10). Additionally, the levels of tolerance reported were also indicators of 
high collinearity; some tolerance values were close to 0.00, which indicates a high degree of 
similarity among the independent variables and hence great difficulty in determining which 
independent variables were meaningful predictors. However, Goldberger (1991) suggests 
that researchers should not be so concerned about collinearity, but instead with whether the 
variances of the coefficient estimates are too large to provide useful estimates of the 
regression coefficients. In this case the standard errors were fairly small relative to the 
unstandardized coefficients. 
Additionally, the possible impact of collinearity was addressed by examining the 
effect size (eta-squared) of each independent variable, which reveals its real contribution to 
the model. 
In sum, even though collinearity was influencing the regression model, given that the 
standard errors were relatively small and that the use of dummy variables made it possible to 




As in previous research (Clarke, 1999; Griffin, 2000; Martin, 1992, 2002), this study 
also found that there is a different perception of safety culture depending on individuals' 
hierarchical level. However, most safety measures that were accounted for seem to be 
important for individuals regardless of their hierarchical level. 
Individuals who are not directly affected by safety issues seem to have a different 
perception of safety culture from those who deal with safety matters daily and directly. 
Those who are not directly affected by safety policies, such as dispatchers and safety 
directors, might believe that there is a strong safety culture even when no safety practices 
were implemented. However, the driver, who is directly affected by safety practices, to some 
extent might also believe that there is a strong safety culture when no safety practices are 
taken into account. 
In the case of dispatchers and safety directors, one may think that those who are not 
directly affected by the risk related with driving seem to dissociate themselves from probably 
negative outcomes; this finding is congruent with the concept of self-serving bias (Bierhoff, 
1989). Dispatchers and safety directors could overestimate the safety culture in the 
organization, because to some extent they are responsible for drivers' safety (e.g., helping 
them loading and unloading the truck, supporting the creation and use of safety policies) and 
might want to assume that safety is being insured. 
Regarding drivers' perception of safety, it is possible that because the risk of driving 
is something that drivers routinely have to deal with and they may believe it is mostly under 
their control, they protect themselves by becoming optimistic about this risk. In other words, 
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truck drivers, as many other drivers, seem to under estimate their susceptibility, because 
persons are unrealistic about their vulnerability to hazards perceived to be controllable 
(Weinstein, 1984). 
Driver Fatigue Training 
An early evaluation of the relationship between training and safety culture showed 
that there is a positive correlation among these issues for drivers, dispatchers, and safety 
directors. Next, by estimating the slope of driver fatigue training for driver, dispatcher, and 
safety director, it was confirmed that this variable was a significant predictor of safety culture 
for individuals on all three hierarchical levels. Subsequently, a more in-depth analysis stated 
that drivers' and safety directors' opinions about training had a different effect on each 
group's perception of safety culture. 
As observed in previous research (Zohar, 1980), employees who are directly involved 
with the activity that requires safety indicated that training is a prerequisite for a safety 
environment and a successful performance. However, it was found that by training drivers 
about fatigue a safety culture was perceived not only by drivers but also by dispatchers and 
safety directors. 
Drivers and dispatchers showed a similar opinion regarding the importance of driver 
s' fatigue training as a predictor of safety. Consensus could be reached if common beliefs 
are shared; this could happen because of the characteristics of their jobs (frequently interact 
with each other) or probably because of the job related experience (have driven a truck). It is 
possible that dispatchers may be involved in drivers' training and know how this may be 
helpful to prevent accidents. There ought to be a consensus (implicit or explicit) regarding 
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the usefulness of training for individuals to have a similar appreciation of it. Finding things 
in common among organizational groups is a powerful means of unity in the workplace. 
Consensus is what makes it possible to find links across groups (Martin, 1992). 
It should be noted that training was one of the major contributors to the overall 
prediction of safety culture, particularly because of the relatively large effect size of drivers' 
opinion of their own fatigue training. Because of the importance that the estimate of drivers' 
fatigue training had for the overall prediction of a safety culture, this ought to be a safety 
issue accounted for in the development of a safety program (even though its significance was 
not equal for all members). 
If further research determines that there is consensus among the different levels of the 
organization, driver fatigue training should be considered by organizations as an issue 
through which its members could find agreement about safety culture. 
Driver Autonomy Regarding Safety 
It was surprising that hardly any support was found for drivers' autonomy. Driver 
autonomy was positively correlated with dispatchers' perception of safety culture. But the 
correlation between driver autonomy and either dispatchers' or safety directors' perception of 
safety culture was found to be significant. Nor was it found to be a predictor of safety 
culture for any individual. The extent to which employees are afforded autonomy is an issue 
that in many industries is taken as a fundamental requirement for safety culture. 
Given the most advanced statistical analysis carried out in this study (multiple 
regression followed by F-test), individuals' opinions about the autonomy that drivers are 
afforded provided an insignificant predictor of safety culture (Tables 2 and 3). Drivers, 
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dispatchers, and safety directors appear to agree on not considering drivers' judgment about 
tiredness (autonomy) as an issue that predicts company's safety culture (i.e., the results failed 
to reject the null hypothesis that stated that the autonomy drivers are afforded was not a 
predictor of safety culture). 
However, this is not a negative finding. This finding supports the use of strong safety 
regulations regarding hours of work in the trucking industry. In the trucking industry, 
employees' autonomy may not have all the positive implications that the literature describes 
for other industries (Karasek et al., 1981; Parker et al., 2001). For example, reducing driver 
autonomy by requiring drivers to drive the same hours each day and following prescribed 
routes could enhance safety as these practices diminish fatigue (Soccomanno et al., 1996). In 
other words, alternative work schedules and flexible work hours have been identified as 
hazards in the trucking industry (Baltes et al., 1999; Soccomanno et al., 1996). Moreover, in 
an industry in which hours of work are not well regulated and non-driving work is often not 
compensated, there is an incentive for drivers to exercise their job autonomy and drive longer 
(i.e., work longer hours) to increase their compensation based on mileage reimbursement 
(Williams &Monaco, 2001). Under these circumstances, affording drivers with even more 
autonomy might enhance hours of service violations, especially since truck drivers are not a 
good judge of how fatigued they are (Wylie, Shultz, Miller, Mitler, &Mackie, 1996). 
It may well be that affording drivers more autonomy could be detrimental for the 
actual highway safety, and by extension, for the company. The effectiveness of autonomy as 
a predictor of safety culture may depend on how employees are being paid and the incentives 
for completing the job on time or given a specific level of quality. In the trucking industry, 
drivers (and sometimes dispatchers) are paid by making a delivery on time and by the 
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amount of time/miles drivers drive. These conditions create economic incentives to continue 
driving when fatigued. To offset these conditions and promote safety (i.e., adhering to hours 
of service regulations, driving the speed limit), strong safety .policies need to be implemented 
and less driver autonomy may be appropriate. 
Driver Opportunities for Safety Input 
Driver opportunity for safety input, which has been explained through the literature 
using the term "participation," was identified as an important predictor of safety culture. 
This was true for the three hierarchical levels that were taken into account in this study (after 
testing the null hypothesis of no difference between the individuals jointly and pairwise 
comparisons of no difference between the individuals —Table 3, D.2. and D.3.-5.). 
But, why was not participation an indicator of safety culture for drivers in the 
regression model as it is for dispatchers and safety directors? This model, as explained 
before, is a conservative statistical model in which items that could be significant are not. To 
overcome this difficulty, F-tests for the difference among individuals were conducted (Table 
3). 
Having found the implications that driver opportunity for safety input had for the 
different organizational members on their perception of safety culture, the idea of stating 
driver participation as a comprehensive safety measure in the trucking industry may be 
supported. Stated differently, driver opportunity for safety input should be universally taken 
into account by organizations as an issue through which its members find agreement about 
safety culture. That is, driver participation allows developing consensus and consistency 
within the corporate culture. 
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In integration views of culture, people at all levels of an organizational hierarchy are 
said to agree about potentially divisive issues (Martin, 1992). In the trucking industry driver 
opportunity for safety input seems to be an issue through which individuals find consensus 
and agreement. 
In the trucking industry, drivers' participation is particularly important to predict the 
overall perception of safety culture because these are the employees who are regularly 
dealing with driving related risks. Moreover, given drivers' hierarchical level, their 
participation is particularly important in the prediction safety culture because participation is 
a favored policy among lower-level employees (Beehr &Gupta, 1987). 
Top Management Commitment to Safety 
As found by previous research (Griffin &Neal, 2000; Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999; 
Zohar, 1980), management commitment to safety has an important effect on individuals' 
perceptions of safety. The three hierarchical levels accounted for found "top management 
commitment to safety" to be a significant predictor of safety culture. 
Even though top management commitment was found to be a significant predictor of 
safety culture for the three categories of respondents, the effect that this variable had over all 
the hierarchical levels observed was not the same. Specifically, the effect that this variable 
had on drivers' perception of safety culture was statistically different from the effect it had 
on dispatchers' and safety directors' perception of safety. On the other hand, it was not 
possible to conclude that top management commitment had a different effect over 
dispatchers' and safety directors' perceptions of safety culture. That is, individuals in higher 
hierarchical levels have a similar appreciation of head office employees' commitment to 
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safety, whereas lower-level employees have a significantly different perception of this issue; 
yet this issue is important for all of them. 
Inconsistency occurs when one manifestation is interpreted in different ways (Martin, 
1992). It is possible that drivers may have a different interpretation of management 
commitment to safety, compared to the meaning management actually gives to this issue. 
Additionally, compared to drivers, it is also possible to find more similarities among 
dispatchers and safety directors regarding their opinion about management commitment. 
Differences among organizational levels may create subcultures, which in turn, may cause 
differences in the effect that management commitment has (Harvey et al., 2001) on the 
perception of safety culture. 
Because top management commitment to safety demonstrated such strong effects on 
the perception of safety in this study, it would be important to find agreement within each 
group regarding the meaning and the importance of this issue. Particularly, it would be 
valuable to know how and why drivers' perceptions of management commitment differed 
from the perception of others. 
Company Performance Safety Rating 
Individuals' perception of safety culture did not match the actual safety measures 
implemented and promoted by trucking companies. Drivers, dispatchers, and safety directors 
seem to overestimate their corporate safety culture. 
This bias was particularly significant for drivers who seem to perceive a stronger 
safety culture when indeed the safety ratings of the company are lower. This finding may be 
related to the self-serving bias that prevents individuals from taking into account facts that 
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are contrary to their beliefs and expectations (Bierhoff, 1989). It is also congruent with 
drivers' tendency to overestimate driving safety conditions (Weinstein, 1984). 
The inaccurate perception of the actual safety performance of the company is a 
finding that supports the nonsignificant effects of drivers' autonomy on individuals' 
perception of safety culture. Given drivers' biased perception of safety, affording them with 
more autonomy would lead to an increase in unsafe behaviors. Because individuals' 
perceptions of safety tend to be incongruent with the actual safety performance of the 
company, strong safety policies that protect the company and the community in general (i.e., 
other drivers} should be enforced. 
Conclusions 
Driver fatigue training, driver opportunity for safety input, and top management 
commitment to safety are safety measures that trucking firms should implement to strengthen 
the perception of safety culture. These issues were perceived by the three hierarchical levels 
accounted for as predictive of a safety culture. 
Perceptions among individuals about issues that determine a safety culture in the 
organization may be different. However, with respect to safety in the trucking industry, there 
are clue issues upon which the different hierarchical levels agree. In this particular case, 
three different hierarchical levels of organizations in the trucking industry are influenced in 
their perceptions of safety culture by drivers' opportunity for safety input training drivers 
about fatigue, and top management commitment to safety. Additionally, individuals coincide 
on not supporting driver autonomy as a predictor of safety culture. This fact is important 
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because it shows that different employees in trucking firms seem to be aware of drivers' 
tendency to overestimate personal and environmental driving safety conditions. 
Because head office employees tend to have a more integrated perspective and may 
expect to reach consensus on the implementation of safety measures, it is useful for them to 
emphasize on safety measures that are not only effective but also equally important for most 
individuals (such as driver participation and driver fatigue training). Furthermore, as Clarke 
(1999) suggests, consensus among members of the organization is the basis of a positive 
safety culture. 
However, in this case one variable, top management commitment to safety, did not 
have the same effect on individuals' perception of safety culture. Different priorities and 
values associated with hierarchical divisions (Clarke, 1999) may explain this result. 
Notice that drivers' opinions of management commitment to safety had the largest 
contribution (effect size) to the model. It is important that management and head office 
employees become aware of the expectations held by lower level employees (i.e., lower level 
employees believe that higher hierarchical levels should be working for a stronger safety 
culture). Management can respond to drivers' expectations by providing training about 
fatigue and by being open to drivers' input about safety. Also, given the nonsupportive 
findings associated with driver autonomy, management should be cautious in relying on 
drivers' judgments as to whether or not they are too tired to drive. Restricting this aspect of 
autonomy could reduce hours of driving violations, close calls, and accidents. 
Although organizational culture may not be all about agreement and stability nor all 
about conflict and confusion, in this case different members of the organization seem to be 
.influenced by the four safety factors examined; although not all the factors had the same 
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effect over the various hierarchical levels. If the company knows some of the issues that 
have the same influence on most or all hierarchical levels perception of safety culture, it 
would be possible to take advantage of these issues and use them to strengthen and integrate 
individuals in the organization. For example, if the firm wants to develop a stronger safety 
culture, driver participation, driver fatigue training, and to some extent, top management 
commitment to safety, would be primary issues that may allow the development of a safety 
program that is perceived by most individuals to be effective. 
Limitations and Suggestions 
A multiple regression model that included three dummy variables allowed 
determining the predictors of a safety culture for each respondent group. The model also was 
used to compare groups and to draw predictors of a safety culture given the overall model. 
However, interactions among the variables accounted for in the model caused some 
collinearity problems. Because of this, predictors that could have been significant were not 
found to be significant. 
Given the safety measures that were not found to be commonly important for 
individuals' perception of safety culture, further research should test each of these 
individually. It is important to determine if the issues proposed by the literature as predictors 
for a safety culture apply in the trucking industry, and specifically, to which groups 
(positions) in the organization. 
The only variable that was found to be significant in the literature that was not 
confirmed here as a significant factor having an effect on safety culture was driver autonomy. 
Further research should suggest a different measure of drivers' autonomy and compare it 
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with how this has been measured in the present study. It should be determined if the extent 
to which drivers are afforded autonomy regarding safety is truly opposite to what is expected 
from other employees. 
It is also important to differentiate which individuals are affected directly by 
companies' safety measures and which are responsible for the use of these measures. 
Because of the self-serving bias, individuals who are responsible for safety may overestimate 
a company's safety culture to protect themselves from negative outcomes. When safety 
programs are implemented or safety polices are evaluated, the self-serving bias should be 
taken into account as a mechanism that may hinder the effectiveness of safety. 
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Opinions about Truck Driving 
The following questions are related to your personal opinions. Please indicate the extent to 
which you think the statement is true, by circling the number which best corresponds to your 
opinion, using a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 = To a Very Little Extent and 7 = To a Very Large 
Extent. (Circle one number for each statement). 
To what extent do you think... 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
To a Very To Some To a Very 
Little Extent Large 
1. Drivers have been trained about driver fatigue issues? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Drivers are the best judges of whether or not they are too tired to drive? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Drivers in your company have opportunities to make suggestions and voice complaints 
regarding safety and fatigue? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Top management at your company is committed to driving safety? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Perceptions About Organizational Safety Culture 
Listed below are statements that represent opinions people have about driving fatigue and 
safety. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement by 
circling the number which best corresponds to your opinion, using a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 = 
Strongly Disagree and 7 =Strongly Agree. (Circle one number for each statement.) 
Statement about driving fatigue and safety 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Strongle 
disagree agree 
1. Our company makes driving safety a top priority. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Driving safety is an important concern at this company. 
1 2 3 4 S 6 7 
3. I am satisfied with the amount of emphasis this company places on driving safety. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Drivers and management openly discuss issues related to driver fatigue. 






Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 
Driver 
1. Safety culture 
2. Driver fatigue training 
3. Driver autonomy 
4. Driver safety input 
5. Top management commitment 
5.21 1.55 (.91) 
4.50 1.93 0.52** 
6.27 1.33 -0.03 0.07 
5.23 1.83 0.45** 0.25** 0.17 
5.65 1.57 0.78** 0.28** -0.01 0.49** 
Dispatcher 
1. Safety culture 
2. Driver fatigue training 
3. Driver autonomy 
4. Driver safety input 
5. Top management commitment 
5.90 1.10 (.88) 
4.57 1.60 0.39** 
5.42 1.66 0.21 * 0.09 
5.76 1.38 0.62** 0.27** 0.10 
6.01 1.37 0.72** 0.21* 0.17 0.67** 
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Descriptive Statistics and Correlations continued 
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 
Safety director 
1. Safety culture 
2. Driver fatigue training 
3. Driver autonomy 
4. Driver safety input 
5. Top management commitment 
5.51 1.15 (.88) 
4.17 1.48 0.36** 
4.82 1.62 0.13 0.06 
4.88 1.65 0.69** 0.27** 0.14 
5.33 1.58 0.70** 0.30** 0.12 0.78** 
Drivers N = 113, Dispatchers N = 98, Safety Directors N = 109. 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *Correlation is significant at the 
0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 2 




Intercept 0.27 0.59 0.00 
Dummy2 1.27 1.96 * 0.01 
Dummy3 2.09 3.55 * * * 0.04 
Driver fatigue training*Dummy 1 0.25 6.25 * * * 0.12 
Driver fatigue training*Dummy2 0.15 2.88* 0.03 
Driver fatigue training*Dummy3 0.12 2.13 * 0.02 
Driver autonomy*Dummy 1 -0.05 -1.08 0.00 
Driver autonomy*Dummy2 0.03 1.08 0.00 
Driver autonomy*Dummy3 0.00 0.20 0.00 
Driver safety input*Dummy 1 0.06 1.38 0.01 
Driver safety input*Dummy2 0.15 2.06* * 0.01 
Driver safety input*Dummy3 0.21 2.95 * * 0.03 
Top management commitment*Dummy 1 0.67 11.91 *** 0.32 
Top management commitment*Dummy2 0.41 5.25 * * * 0.08 
Top management commitment*Dummy3 0.28 3.47 * * * 0.04 
N = 315 (33 observations were excluded). 
Dummy 1 =Driver, Dummy2 =Dispatcher, Dummy3 =Safety director 
F = 41.59 
p<.OS. 
R2 = 0.66 Adjusted R2 = 0.64 




A B C D E 
Comparisons Driver Top 
(Null hypothesis) ~tercept Training Autonomy safety management input commitment 
Driver, Dispatcher, 18.24* * * 17.31 * * * 0.79 4.94* * 60.50* 1 ' S afet director = 0 y 
Driver =Dispatcher = .19 2.44 1.17 1.75 - 9.03 2. 2 Safety director 
3. Driver =Dispatcher 0.94 2.59 2.33 1.05 7.46* 
Driver= Safety 3.33 3.98* 0.92 3.19 15.86*** 4' director 
Dispatcher =Safety 2,00 0.17- 0.41 0.40 1.33 5' director 
*p<.OS. *p<.01. **p<.001 
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Table 4 
Company Performance Safety Rating and Perception of Safety Culture 
Variable Mean SD N 1 2 3 
1. Company 
Performance rating 
2. Driver perception of 
safety culture 
3. Dispatcher 
perception of safety 5.9 1.10 102 0.087 0.28 * 
culture 
2.01 0.74 116 
5.21 1.55 115 -0.22* 
4 . Safety director 
perception of safety 5.51 1.15 110 0.127 0.173 0.28 
culture 
p < .O5 . *p<.Ol. 
